Meaning, Mind, and Matter, Part 1

As demonstrated in the last post, the meaning of language must be in the minds who use language. Of course I haven’t questioned whether or not we could just say language is meaningless, and so not have to place the meaning somewhere, because the statement “There is no meaning” suffers from absurdity. So on with my next question; What is mind?

There are four answers to this question;

1) There is no “mind,” only an illusion of unified sense experience

2) The mind is identical to the brain, and visa versa

3) The mind is something immaterial, albeit strongly connected to the brain

4) The mind is something immaterial

To (1), I would make a response similar to my defense of free will. It is undeniable that we have said unified sense experience, for even a deceived perception is still perception; the very premises required to establish the data we reason from to determine that there is the experience of a unified sense experience is from experience; the testimony of experience against experience of a single subject is impossible to prove; ergo, we can’t reject the testimony of our experience of a unified sense experience based on other experience. But if we rid of that reason (i.e. the supposed scientific data that demonstrates there to be no center of consciousness), then we have no reason to reject that our unified sense experience is real; ergo our unified sense experience (aka center of consciousness, or mind) is real.

It is also further absurd to portray our experience of center of consciousness as a deception, because a deception is still a perception, and this deception must still be a deception to a unified perceiving center. This would mean that our deceived perception of a unified sense experience must still be presented to a center of consciousness in order to be a deception; but such a deception of unified sense experience to a unified sense experience is absurd. Therefore, there is a center of consciousness, aka mind.

(2) is more worthy of an opponent, because it at least has the semblance of being a possibility. Proponents of (2) point to the complexity of our brain, and ascertain that in such complexity such “complex” things like meaning, intentionality, and concept could be found. However, there is a problem.

In the example of my previous post, the meaning of the word “fork” as used by minds must be located in the mind, and cannot be anywhere else. Now if the meaning content must be in the mind, and the mind is identical to the brain, then this would be the same as saying that the meaning of the word fork must be located in the brain. The brain is wholly material, a collection of electrochemical synapses and material neurons. In such complexity, it is assured, you can find such devilishly abstract objects, for, it is again assured, the brain is so complex that you would be able to find it if only you studied it long enough, instead of postulating the existence of some immaterial object like an irresponsible armchair philosopher. [My characterization like this is based on the fact that I have never found a description of monism (brain is mind, mind is brain) that doesn’t involve derision of those who disagree, equating immateriality with “magic.” Example 1, Example 2]

I give such ways of thinking the title of “Mushy Matter Fallacy.” The assumption that where there is complexity, anything associated in some way to that complexity can be reduced to simpler parts of that complexity, in other words, there are no irreducible objects in the face of a complex base it can be found they are founded in (just have faith!).

But what is the brain made out of? Matter. Matter, even when its wet and organic and biological, is still mechanical. It functions according to the same physical laws of any other brass machine; even when its chemistry, such chemistry is based upon physics equations. Matter is determined; it can do nothing but follow its own laws that dictate its impetus, shape, form, organization, etc.

Now if there is only matter, but there is meaning, then the meaning must be somewhere. The meaning of the word fork, then, if there is only matter, must be identical to some arrangement of matter; which is to say, a such-and-such arrangement of matter means “fork.” But this is the nitty-gritty; how can matter mean or intend something? Any composition of matter outside the brain never means something except as determined by a mind; but if it is true that something has its meaning as composed by a mind, and the meaning of something can be in a composition of matter, then there must be some mind outside of this composition of matter that gave it meaning, and that, therefore, this mind must be immaterial.

Allow me to put my argument here in a more basic form;

1) Meaning must  be an arrangement of matter (material principle assumed for reductio ad absurdum)

2) Something has its meaning as determined by a mind

3) There is meaning in the brain

4) This meaning must be there by the determination of a mind

5) Therefore, the mind is immaterial (not identical to the brain)

So now, if we were to analyze my brain and know how to interpret its data to be able to confidently say I am thinking of a fork, this would be because there is an assumption of mind. If you only analyzed the data without assuming the presence of the mind, you would only have “This electrochemical signal went to this neuron, causing this neuron to send this electrochemical signal…” which is not what the meaning of a fork is. If the mind were identical to the brain in its material composition, then the thoughts of the mind must be identical to material compositions; however, this mere material data without the assumption of an intending mind is not enough to know what is being thought; therefore the mind is immaterial.

I will continue with my analysis of (3) and (4) in Part 2.

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