Let us discuss possible worlds. Modal logic typically makes reference to total accounts of the ways things in reality can be. However, I believe that, in this discussion, we have good reason to change our definition slightly to suit the topic. Here is my reasoning.
In God there lies the potential for every single possible world. There is not a single possible world that God doesn’t know about, and that God doesn’t know in which way that world is distinct from every other world, no matter how similar it is to other possible worlds.
Now, if each possible world is known as distinct to God, then I believe this means we can analyze each possible world’s existence without regards to any other possible world. Does this world or that world exist? I believe we can ask “Why not both worlds?” My reasoning is that, if a possible world is known to God, then that implies a separate being separate from other possible worlds, and they are not inconsistent with each other’s existence. This means that I am making a sort of realist claim about the existence of possible worlds; I’m not saying that they exist, but that they are individual objects of God’s knowledge, and as such can possibly exist. So we’re talking about possible worlds as God’s knowledge, which is different than talking about logically compatible states this world could have; so I propose we talk about Universe-Worlds, as opposed to modal worlds. This employs roughly the same language, but they are considered to be different in virtue of the aspect from which they are being considered, and since we are considering these possible worlds as objects of God’s knowledge, Him knowing each distinct from the other, implies the separate reality of each. A Universe-World (from here on a “U-World”) is a separate plane of reality, having no causal or metaphysical relation to any other U-World except in respect to both being objects of God’s knowledge. (I stress the reason for which I’m talking about ontologically distinct worlds as opposed to abstract logically possible worlds in order to distinguish why I’m choosing to talk this way, but also in which way this use of the modal semantics is different.)
If U-Worlds are ontologically distinct from each other, then the existence of one is logically compatible with either the existence or non-existence of any other U-World, no matter how similar they might superficially appear. U-Worlds have nothing to say about each other, except in respect to their being creations of the One God. The conclusion is that it is possible for God to create multiple U-Worlds.
If U-Worlds are distinct from each other, then this means that the ontological constituents are also ontologically distinct from, not only the ontological constituents of their own respective U-World, but the ontological constituents of other U-Worlds. Thus, a particular U-World cannot be changed from its own total account of objects and actions and yet remain the same U-World, because it would then be similar to another U-World (the U-World in which something was changed from the way it would’ve otherwise been, but is not what it is due to, say, God’s miraculous intervention on the course of affairs). But if the ontological constituents are ontologically distinct from the ontological constituents of other U-Worlds, then the fact that a U-World cannot be changed and remain the same U-World implies that those ontological constituents only exist in that particular U-World.
The consequence is this; if an entity only exists in one particular U-World, it cannot exist in any other U-World. The entity’s particular existence goes hand in hand with the existence of all the other entities that compose the constitution of that particular U-World; and the U-World being changed (via the addition or subtraction of the ontological constituents) would imply the non-creation of that particular ontologically distinct entity.
Concretely, then, persons only exist in their respective world. You and I are absolutely modally contingent, being entities of this U-World and no other U-World. If God had not created this particular U-World with all its respective ontological constituents, then He would not have been creating this particular U-World with our particular existences. If anything were changed in the composition of this U-World’s ontological constituents, we wouldn’t exist.
This means that, unless God created this particular world with our existence and this world’s history, then in God not creating this U-World, God could not have created us, because we are modally contingent.
Edit: This preceding discussion of U-Worlds is clarified in this post. The same holds true for modal contingency, but I do more to explain why I don’t believe our world could be any way but the way it is.
The implication of this fact (the absolutely modally contingent existence of ontological constituents in their particular U-World; we’ll call this the principle of absolute contingency) along with our consideration of God not wishing to refuse the gift of beatific vision to someone because another refused will give an explanation for why God has chosen to create this particular world with its evils.
[…] The Many-Worlds Theodicy, Part 3 […]
I’m not sure about these U-Worlds. I’ll lay out a mixture of what I take to be your argument and what I think is the best sort of argument to be made with this. Let me know how close to the mark I am in putting it this way:
1. God is omniscient, and so has knowledge of all possible worlds in every particular.
2. There corresponds to every fact known by God a mental representation in God’s mind.
3. A possible world can be described as a single (long conjunctive) fact.
4. So, there corresonds to every possible world a mental representation in God’s mind.
5. Let ‘U-World’ stand for such a mental representation, which corresponds to a possible world known by God.
6. Because U-Worlds are mental representations (unlike possible worlds), U-Worlds are ontologically distinct. That is, the existence of one U-World does not preclude the existence of another (again, unlike possible worlds).
7. Therefore, it is possible for God to create multiple U-Worlds.
8. Because U-Worlds are mental representations of possible worlds, they share the rigidity of identity that possible worlds have. That is, to change a U-World in some way would be to change which possible world it represented, and so to change what U-World it was.
9. So, if God is to create a particular U-World he must create it as it is, warts and all, else he would not be creating that U-World, but another instead.
10. God is omnibenevolent, and so would create every U-World that is on balance good.
11. So, God would create multiple U-Worlds, warts and all. (Our world is such a U-World).
Taichi;
Yes, that would be a very good summary of my argument, allowing for some qualifications I’d like to make.
U-Worlds as “mental representations in God’s mind” refers to “God’s mind” and these “mental representations” in a strictly abstract, analogous sense. (I make this qualification because I firmly believe in divine simplicity. The reality of these mental representations could lead to particular problems without this stipulation about their abstract being.)
Modal logic still has a place in reference to U-Worlds. If we wanted to refer to a total description of all actualized U-Worlds, wherein the only ontological connection between any U-World and another is simply through their necessary connection to God’s being, we could say “Meta U-World.” So we could distinguish between one set of possibly actualized U-Worlds and another set in this way, which will be relevant for determining what it takes for a U-World to be justified.
“Yes, that would be a very good summary of my argument, allowing for some qualifications I’d like to make.”
Good. I’ll continue to refer to mental representations in God’s mind, not really understanding the alternative, but I won’t push their apparent multiplicity as a criticism. I’ve something else in mind.
I think 1-5 of the theodicy are unobjectionable. But the move from 6 to 7 appears to rely on equivocation, depending on how we interpret ‘U-World’. Point 6..
“6. Because U-Worlds are mental representations (unlike possible worlds), U-Worlds are ontologically distinct. That is, the existence of one U-World does not preclude the existence of another (again, unlike possible worlds).”
..is true only if are strictly considering U-Worlds as representations, not as the possible worlds they represent. For it is only true of the U-Worlds qua representations that the existence of one U-World does not preclude the existence of another: to instead think of U-Worlds in terms of what they represent, we would be thinking of possible worlds themselves, and we know that the existence of one possible world does preclude the others. Similarly remarks apply to point 7..
“7. Therefore, it is possible for God to create multiple U-Worlds.”
..which follows from a true 6, again only if we are consistent in taking U-Worlds to be mental representations, not as signifying the possible worlds they represent. For whilst it follows from the fact that U-Worlds qua representations do not preclude the existence of one another that God can create multiple U-Worlds qua representations, it does not follow from U-Worlds qua representations that God can create multiple U-Worlds considered as the possible worlds they represent.
I said that the move from 6 to 7 appears to rely on equivocation because I think here you mean to move from the possibility of multiple U-Worlds qua representations to the possibility of God’s creating multiple U-Worlds considered as the concrete totalities which are the possible worlds they represent. But suppose I am wrong, and the points 1-11 consistently employ the sense of U-World qua representation: then nothing of philosophical interest follows, for that God can create multiple U-Worlds qua representations just means that God can create multiple mental representations of possible worlds, not that God is able to create the totalities of concreta which are being mentally represented. Consistently interpreting “U-World” in this way does not answer the LPOE.
I’m specifically avoiding any equivocation, and am consistently referring to U-Worlds as “mental representations.” I’m going to develop the implication of this in Part 4. If you’re not satisfied with my accounting of possible worlds and U-Worlds, then I’ll make room for such a discussion in the Addendum.
[…] Part 3. […]
“I’m specifically avoiding any equivocation, and am consistently referring to U-Worlds as “mental representations.””
Well, if you say so. But as I said, if you do consistently employ ‘U-World’ to refer to mental representations qua mental representations, then that God can create multiple U-Worlds isn’t philosophically interesting: creating multiple U-Worlds qua mental representations is just creating multiple mental representations. Put another way, you’re departing from the fact that God has a plenum of possible worlds in his mind and arriving at the fact that it is possible that he should create (think?) the very same multiplicity of mental phenomena. That conclusion doesn’t help solve the LPOE.
“I’m going to develop the implication of this in Part 4.”
I’ve looked at it, and I have some old criticisms that you’ve already heard. But the key misstep has already been made, I think. If you’re not equivocating, then creating U-Worlds is just creating some mental objects, and that God can create many of these mental objects fails to show that God can create alongside each other the concrete totalities corresponding to these mental objects.
Isn’t it a good thing that U-Worlds are “philosophically uninteresting?” That makes them trivially true, and not controversial, so harder to object to. I don’t understand why you think this is a misstep; if I’ve demonstrated here that there are reasons to believe in the Principle of Absolute Contingency (construed this way in regards to the U-Worlds in their own totality), then the question has become (as concluded in Part 4) “Should God deny the good to deny evil?”
“Isn’t it a good thing that U-Worlds are “philosophically uninteresting?” ”
That wasn’t what I said: I said that God’s being able to create multiple U-Worlds was philosophically uninteresting.
“I don’t understand why you think this is a misstep”
Because U-Worlds are mere mental representations, Bryce. They’re ideas in God’s mind. And when God creates U-Worlds, what he creates are ideas in his own mind – that’s what follows from unequivocal treatment of U-Worlds qua mental representations. You ask..
“Should God deny the good to deny evil?”
.. and you assume that God’s not creating a U-World with a mixture of good and evil would amount to denying good so as to deny evil. But that’s just false: a U-World is a mere mental representation of a possible world, and mere mental representations do not have good and evil as constituents. Sure, they represent a possible world and in so doing represent good and evil constituents, but in representing good and evil they do not thereby acquire the qualities of good and evil. In fact, as mere representations, they’re morally neutral, so thinking about U-Worlds doesn’t even raise the question of whether God should deny good to deny evil. U-Worlds are simply irrelevant to the LPOE.
I don’t understand the nature of your objection.
There is some world X. X is only its essential parts µ; if you subtract, add, or change the composition of any of the parts, then it is not world X.
µ includes good and evil actions.
Would God be justified in creating world X?
Well, do you understand that a representation differs from what it represents? That, for example, the picture of a malnourished African child that heads your post is not one and the same thing as the malnourished African child which it represents?
If you do understand that, do you also see why, whilst the African child’s being malnourished is a shocking instance of suffering, the picture itself which represents the child is not itself an instance of suffering, and therefore not an instance of evil in the broad philosophical sense?
And if you understand that, do you also see that this point goes for representations and things represented in general: that representations of evil not themselves evil? And vice versa: that representations are not themselves good, either?
Now consider your U-Worlds, which you say are to be understood as mental representations. Applying the generalization above, we can say that these mental representations are not themselves good or evil. For similar reasons to the above, we can also say that they do not contain good or evil parts, and so do not contain good or evil actions. What they represent, of course, has or would have good and evil parts (the former if the U-World represents the actual world, the latter if the U-World represents any other possible world), but these facts about what the U-Worlds represent does not license one to ascribe the parts to the U-World itself.
So suppose that God creates a U-World. U-Worlds are mental representations, so God creates a mental representation. Suppose that mental representation is of a possible world containing both good and evil parts. Does God thereby create good and evil parts? No, he doesn’t, for in creating a representation one does not create the parts which are represented. The photographer of the malnourished African child does not create a malnourished African child; Botticelli’s painting Venus is not tantamount to the creation of Venus herself; and neither is God’s creation of a U-World the same thing as creating the good and evil parts which the U-World represents.
Where did you get the idea that I was meaning “God creates mental representations?” The mental representations are given potentialities; the question is which U-Worlds God would be justified in actualizing.
Because you said..
“I’m specifically avoiding any equivocation, and am consistently referring to U-Worlds as “mental representations.” ”
.. and I took you at your word: that when you write about God creating U-Worlds, you are writing about God creating mental representations.
Would you like to take that back now, and answer instead the charge of equivocation I was pressing earlier?
Let’s abandon this talk of U-Worlds being like mental representations then, because this is causing such a hang-up for you. I have been meaning U-Worlds as unique, non-exclusive, sums of objects and events that God knows of exhaustively. U-Worlds are not possible worlds, nor are they just mental representations. We can think of them as being, insofar as they could be just a non-actualized potentiality, to be a “mental representation God has,” like the idea a painter has for a painting he shall paint, but as we can speak of the painter’s idea being actualized in the painting, so we talk of U-Worlds being actualized when they are instantiated by God rather than only being potentials He considers (this is still all analogy!) creating. A U-World is to which “God’s mental representation” refers to as “the painter’s idea” is actualized in the painting.
I see now where the departure has been. I thought you meant that it would be right to talk of U-Worlds being like mental representations, but I do not mean them as being just mental representations. I’m referring to the potential sums, not the ideas themselves.
Does this help?
“Does this help?”
I’m not sure. You say that you’ll abandon talk of U-Worlds being like mental representations, but then you say that we can think of a U-World as being like a mental representation God has. You say that U-Worlds are not possible worlds, but then you say that in referring to U-Worlds you are referring to potential sums of objects and events, not ideas, and such sums sound exactly like possible worlds. It really doesn’t sound like you know what you mean.
On the other hand, you do write of actualization, and perhaps putting my point in terms of that would help. Continuing with the assumption that U-Worlds are mental representations, we could distinguish between God’s creating U-Worlds, which would mean his creating mental representations, and his actualizing U-Worlds, which involves creating what the U-Worlds represent. Similarly, we can speak of a U-World’s existing, which means a mental representation’s existing, and a U-World’s being actual, which would mean the existence of what the U-World represented. On that interpretation, the move from 6 to 7 is clearly valid..
6. Because U-Worlds are mental representations (unlike possible worlds), U-Worlds are ontologically distinct. That is, the existence of one U-World does not preclude the existence of another (again, unlike possible worlds).
7. Therefore, it is possible for God to simulataneously create multiple U-Worlds.
.. since that multiple U-Worlds do not preclude the existence of one another just means that one mental representation doesn’t preclude the existence of another mental representation. On the other hand, the move from 6 to 7*..
6. Because U-Worlds are mental representations (unlike possible worlds), U-Worlds are ontologically distinct. That is, the existence of one U-World does not preclude the existence of another (again, unlike possible worlds).
7*. Therefore, it is possible for God to simulataneously actualize multiple U-Worlds.
.. is invalid, since the fact that one mental representation does not preclude the existence of another does not license one to say that both mental representations can be actualized. For example, one may have in mind two possible accounts of the assassination of JFK, one in which Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone to assassinate JFK, and another in which multiple gunmen were involved. Both of these can exist as mental representations, but both cannot simultaneously be actual: the accounts they give of events are mutually exclusive. Finally, if one rewrites 6 in such a way that would validate the move to 7*..
6*. Because U-Worlds are mental representations (unlike possible worlds), U-Worlds are ontologically distinct. That is, the actualization of one U-World does not preclude the existence of another (again, unlike possible worlds).
7*. Therefore, it is possible for God to simulataneously actualize multiple U-Worlds.
..then 6* comes out false: the actualization of a U-World is the same as the creation of what the U-World represents, and what a U-World represents is a possible world. But the creation of a possible world does preclude the existence of another possible world, for possible worlds are mutually exclusive (were some possible world W1 not to exclude some world W2, then W1 and W2 would agree on the truth value of every proposition, and so would be one and the same possible world).
“Continuing with the assumption that U-Worlds are mental representations, we could distinguish between God’s creating U-Worlds, which would mean his creating mental representations, and his actualizing U-Worlds, which involves creating what the U-Worlds represent. Similarly, we can speak of a U-World’s existing, which means a mental representation’s existing, and a U-World’s being actual, which would mean the existence of what the U-World represented. On that interpretation, the move from 6 to 7 is clearly valid.”
Yes, that sounds like what I mean.
Now, speaking of the existence of multiple actualized U-Worlds, then I point to this;
“If U-Worlds are distinct from each other, then this means that the ontological constituents are also ontologically distinct from, not only the ontological constituents of their own respective U-World, but the ontological constituents of other U-Worlds. Thus, a particular U-World cannot be changed from its own total account of objects and actions and yet remain the same U-World, because it would then be similar to another U-World (the U-World in which something was changed from the way it would’ve otherwise been, but is not what it is due to, say, God’s miraculous intervention on the course of affairs). But if the ontological constituents are ontologically distinct from the ontological constituents of other U-Worlds, then the fact that a U-World cannot be changed and remain the same U-World implies that those ontological constituents only exist in that particular U-World.”
So, speaking of logically possible accounts for the JFK assassination, we can speak about possible worlds in which there was only Oswald vs. multiple gunmen. In terms of modal semantics, we could speak about the same ontologically unique JFK and logically possible accounts where, at the end of the day, either, for this real world, there was only Oswald or multiple gunmen involved. Here we have mental representations of possible worlds. Possible worlds might be considered “everything that God might have actualized.”
However, U-Worlds are not “everything that God might have actualized” but “ontological sets that God might actualize.” To borrow from mereological essentialism, any U-World x is x only if its contains the entirety of its particular conjunctive part-set µ. This U-World is only this U-World if it happens to be the world in which (and we’ll assume this is true) Oswald acted alone. A different U-World, say where there were multiple gunmen, would be another U-World, but couldn’t be this U-World, and would have entirely unique ontological constituents, such that the man who is superficially exactly like our JFK would be an ontologically distinct person. Both accounts can be true, on the condition we’re assuming that it can only be one particular way for each U-World, and the ontological constituents of each U-World are unique.
“Yes, that sounds like what I mean.”
That’s still unfortunate, because as I keep trying to explain, God’s being able to simultaneously create multiple U-Worlds doesn’t help with the problem of evil. Creating U-Worlds is just creating mental representations, and that the existence of these mental representations are consistent with each other says nothing about their being able to be actualized together. In fact, their being representations of possible worlds precludes their being actualized together.
But I’ve said this before, and I don’t know how to say it differently to make you understand. You’re not even in the ballpark: for some reason you keep arguing for your principle of absolute contingency, which I haven’t even bothered to question.
I give up.
*shrugs*
I thought you had come to understand what I meant, but I suppose I was wrong. U-Worlds are not representations of possible worlds.
[…] fundamental part of my argument is the discussion of U-Worlds, especially in Part 3. What are U-Worlds? Taichi in the comments illustrated a confusion due to an ambiguity with the way […]
Here, I’ve revised my discussion of U-Worlds here, I hope it helps to clarify.