I want to start talking about what it is that we mean when we speak about atomic and sub-atomic particles, waves, statistical indeterminacy, and such. However, before we get to that, we need to talk about the Gettier problem of knowledge.
What makes an article of belief knowledge? Typically, the account of Western philosophy has been that knowledge is justified true belief. Something counts as knowledge if the proposition is justified to the individual, true, and it is a belief. Gettier gave a story which seemed to have an individual who had a belief that was justified and also happened to be true, yet intuitively we wouldn’t think to call their belief knowledge. Here’s the story I want to focus on;
- Smith has applied for a job, but, it is claimed, has a justified belief that “Jones will get the job”. He also has a justified belief that “Jones has 10 coins in his pocket”. Smith therefore (justifiably) concludes (by the rule of the transitivity of identity) that “the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket”.
- In fact, Jones does not get the job. Instead, Smith does. However, as it happens, Smith (unknowingly and by sheer chance) also had 10 coins in his pocket. So his belief that “the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket” was justified and true. But it does not appear to be knowledge.
I was always bothered by this story, not because I have any special attachment to the description of belief as justified true belief and I think this story seems to set my intuition against such a description, but because it so obviously misses an important principle. When Smith concludes “the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket,” this is not to the elimination of his belief that “Jones will get the job.” Smith still believes that Jones will get the job, and in virtue of this belief does he believe the other thing. The logic looks like this;
1) Jones will get the job
2) Jones has 10 coins in his pocket
3) Therefore, the man with 10 coins in his pocket will get the job
That the conclusion is true because Smith also has 10 coins in his pocket is unimportant. In fact, it’s just trivial; it might as well have been some belief about “the man with brown hair” or “the man wearing glasses,” but Smith is still believing that Jones will get the job. Any parts of the descriptions about Jones that Smith forms articles of belief about in reference to getting a job are only descriptions about Jones. The meaningful content of the conclusion is really this;
3′) Jones, who has 10 coins in his pocket, will get the job
This is because the former conclusion is only a proposition in virtue of some other statement. As such, the former conclusion has its meaning, in the way Smith formulates the proposition, founded on the meaning of the first premise, that Jones will get the job. This means that the logic of the former argument is invalid, because (3) as meant to be understood is meaningless, because Smith only understands “the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket” to have its meaning because he believes Smith will get the job. The meaningful content of the proposition cannot be separated from its foundation, or how Smith understands it to be true.
As such, it means that the Gettier problem is just a paradox, solved by some clarification of semantics.
The greater implication for such a solution to Gettier’s problem of knowledge is that how something is understood to be true, or more basically, how something is known, is part of the content of knowledge. So, for instance, when I say
4) There is a can of Diet Coke on my table right now
5) I dislike Diet Coke
6) There is a beverage which I dislike on my table right now
that last statement has its meaning in virtue of the preceding premises, and so cannot be separated from them and be meaningful on its own.
Now of course I do not mean that general statements like “There is a beverage which I dislike on my table right now” to be generally meaningless, but it lacks the meaning that would make the proposition true if it turned out that green tea was on my table (and I also dislike green tea). Though the two propositions would be semiotically identically, they would have different meanings, depending on which they are true in virtue of. In fact, the two propositions are also meaningfully different from the generalized “there is a beverage which I dislike on my table right now” if I’m not meaning the proposition in virtue of something I know about the beverage except that I dislike it. But in this case, the meaning is virtual; if the statement were to be true, it would have to be justified by something, and so would have meaning relevant to what it is justified by; having justification in virtue of some substantial set of premises, the proposition would then be substantially meaningful.
So we are able to mean something in our propositions even when we don’t mean them in a justified way (as knowledge would be). It is just that we can distinguish between at least these two types of meaningful proposition;
Substantially meaningful – the proposition is asserted in virtue of some known premises
Virtually meaningful – the proposition is asserted about some possible object which could fulfill the (implicitly or explicitly) specified condition/s without being about any particular thing
This defeats the possibility of transitivity, so that we can’t mistake “the man with 10 coins in his pocket” who is Jones and “the man with 10 coins in his pocket” who is Smith.
Here’s something I wish to note, that will be relevant for our upcoming discussion on sub-atomic particles and such. For a proposition to be (at least possibly) scientific, it must be intrinsically tied to some possible experiment or set of experiments. And experiment is nothing but some specialized sort of observation with some control to bring to light some particular effect being conjectured about. This means that all scientific propositions must be in virtue of something else known through observation.
I was always troubled in high school and college when the topic of scientific method was brought up and then various other things in the “sciences” were asserted. For example, an astronomy teacher said the universe was 15 billion years old and this was science. The statement that the universe is really that old may or may not be true, but there’s nothing in the scientific method that we can employ to create a hypothesis, run a sample big bang a handful of times, and then generate observations that lead to a theory. Rather, it always seemed to me, this was a different sort of science, a different sort of “knowing,” than traditional scientific method science (dropping a pen ten times and seeing if gravity pulled it toward my other hand all ten times).
SO, I like this exploration you’re doing here Bryce and I’m eager to see where it takes you. Having gotten to chapter three of Hawking’s newest book, I’m continually amazed at how he proclaims that “philosophy is dead” and that science alone is king and yet he routinely gets philosophical and abandons the very scientific method he says must guide knowledge by wandering into all sorts of theoretical “knowledge.” Anyway, I’m eagerly awaiting your exploration.
REV
The essence of the scientific method is “testability” and “repeatability”
Any sort of assertion/hypothesis has to be testable to qualify as “science” and the test must be repeatable by “anybody”
“logic” only features for devising “tests”
banal example:
Your conclusion about there being a drink you dislike on your table is not scientific. Your dislike has to be “testable”. A scientist would make you drink it and record your reaction. The test must be repeatable, so another scientist can make you drink that same drink and also record your reaction.
Regarding your comment on subatomic particles, their existence is testable in principle. It is a limitation of the instruments used in the investigations that prevents us having “pictures” of the subatomic particles.
Their existence has been predicted by “logic” but before we can observe them or the effect of their interaction with matter we cannot say that subatomic particle X exists.
“Belief” in science is limited to believing what one reads in the journals. Anyone can decide to repeat any experiment.
Had scientists stuck to “logic” we wouldn’t be discussing quantum physics, nor would we have arrived at DNA.
I would say that logic is based on scientific method, so scientific method cannot use logic to “justify itself”. I don’t know if I’m getting myself across.
Re the comment above, when we say that the universe is 14bn years old, it is always “suffixed” with “current measuring methods”. Same reason. In principle the age of the universe is quantifiable. It’s our instruments that let us down.
[…] Comments « The Meaningfulness of Scientific Propositions, Part 1 […]
Reuben…
I think I understand what you’re saying about instrumentation. But even so, wouldn’t you agree that that sort of “science” is different than repeated experiment and observation science? It seems to me these are two different fields of thought and knowledge. The former is observation and history based, whereas the latter is testable/repeated-experimental based. Thoughts?
REV
Josh,
Some things lend themselves very well to the “repeated experiment and observation science” while others don’t.
Let’s stick to the “age of the universe” example. I don’t know the precise details of the techniques used to “measure” it, however, they are based on techniques that can (and have been) repeatedly tested here “on earth”.
let’s take a “ruler factory” as a (stupid) example. Once the accuracy of the ruler has been verified and all the quality control tests have been done, you can use the ruler with confidence anywhere outside the factory.
Same with these “techniques” they have been tried and tested and what we’re seeing is only the “end product” of years of corrections and refinements. If we’re talking about red shifts, for instance, these red shifts have been studied, investigated and possibly reproduced under controlled conditions and “all their possible causes known” (if you’ll allow me a little hyperbole :) ) So when we see a red shift we can say with confidence that X has most probably happened that has caused the red shift. It is always open to revision, of course. So far it’s science. Remember: the essence of scientific method is “testability”. And, for scientific method to be effective, we need something which is often taken for granted viz. the constancy of “laws” in time and space. (e.g. science wouldn’t be much help if a chemical reacts in a way today and when tested 20 years down the line we observe a completely unrleated reaction)
Now I’ll show you how something that deals with eminently “scientific” issues can be non-scientific.
In the late 19th century one Philip Henry Gosse – a natural historian (= biologist) proposed a theory in his “magnum opus” Omphalos that the world was created complete with fossil and geological records from the word go. His reasoning was that life is “circular” so when God inserts his “wafer” of creation one has to be left with the impression that the point of creation flows logically and naturally from an illusory – as in suppositious – past. And to really shoot himself in the foot he adds that this theory – whether accepted or not – won’t make any difference to the notions of evolution, because God wants us to believe that life evolves, even though he planted an evolution starter pack himself, without anything actually evolving.
What tests – I don’t necessarily mean tests in a lab – can you devise to support or challenge that? So it’s not science. I won’t comment on the fact that from a “religious” point of view it’s not much of a theory because I’m sure God wouldn’t want to play cruel tricks on us – bit that’s beside the point.
Scientific method is not tests run in a lab. Scientific method is the fact that tests can even be devised. I don’t know if the distinction is clear. Also – in keeping with the general ethos of this blog ( I think) – this is what we mean when we say that religion is beyond the scope of science. This is not to say that if we can’t explain X we just say God made it so and leave it at that. Is something testable in essence? if no it is “religion” if yes it’s science.
Apologies for the long winded reply.
[…] proposition by utilizing a distinction made about the meaningfulness of propositions in this post. Basically, what I argued is this; how something is understood to be true, or more basically, how […]